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Decoupling Federal Offense Guidelines from 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) must strike a 
delicate balance when incorporating statutory limits on sentencing into the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (Guidelines).  On one hand, the Guide-
lines must be “consistent with all pertinent provisions of any Federal        
statute.”
1
  On the other, the Commission’s “characteristic institutional role” is 
to advise sentencing courts based on “empirical data and national experi-
ence.”
2
  Particularly in the realm of controlled substance offenses, the   
Commission may find itself hard-pressed to reconcile harsh, quantity-based 
statutorily-mandated minimum sentences with its own research, expertise, 
and judgment.  In such a situation, the Commission has three choices: (1) 
calibrate its offense guideline by proportionately extrapolating the statutory 
limitation across the guideline; (2) incorporate the statutory limit into the 
offense guideline to the least extent possible, often resulting in anomalous 
cliffs and plateaus within the offense guideline; or (3) not incorporate the 
statutory limit into the offense guideline but permit the statutory provision to 
limit an offender’s ultimate Guidelines range through the operation of Chap-
ter Five of the manual. 
This Article discusses the sensibility of each of these three options.  Part 
II sets forth a hypothetical controlled substance offense to better illustrate the 
choices faced by the Commission.  Part III recounts approaches that the 
Commission has actually adopted in incorporating statutory limits into the 
  
 * Teaching Fellow and Assistant Professor of Professional Practice, Louisiana 
State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center.  Many thanks to Bill Corbett for his 
thoughtful comments.  Thanks as well to A.J. Million and Molly O’Flynn for their 
careful proofreading. 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2006). 
 2. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007). 
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Guidelines.  Part IV addresses the goals of guideline sentencing and con-
cludes that the Guidelines’ structure should be primarily driven by actual 
fairness concerns.  Applying actual fairness as the overriding concern, Part V 
concludes that statutory limits should not be incorporated into an offense 
guideline when some offenders subject to the guideline will not be subject to 
the statutory limit.  In particular, the drug distribution guideline should be 
decoupled from Congress’s mandatory minimum sentences and revised to 
reflect the Commission’s purest sentencing recommendations because de-
fendants can avoid mandatory minimum sentences either through the opera-
tion of the statutory “safety valve” or through the government’s failure to 
charge or adequately prove triggering drug quantities.  The current drug dis-
tribution guideline, which is extrapolated from statutorily-imposed mandatory 
minimum sentences, works actual unfairness when applied to defendants who 
are not subject to those mandatory minimums. 
II.  A HYPOTHETICAL COMMISSION AND THE BETEL NUT GUIDELINE 
In order to conceptualize the issue at hand, it is perhaps easiest to take a 
step back from the reality of the United States’ current federal sentencing 
scheme and enter a hypothetical parallel sentencing universe.  Envision a 
fresh sentencing commission with the wisdom, research, and expertise to 
promulgate “pure” offense guidelines.  For the purposes of this section, pure 
offense guidelines are guidelines that are correct from the commission’s point 
of view in the absence of any external legislative directives.  Pure offense 
guidelines are the commission’s best effort to independently develop guide-
lines based on data and experience that produce proper ranges of imprison-
ment based on the seriousness of the offense conduct and the characteristics 
of the offender.
3
  If the commission were king, the pure guidelines would be 
the sentencing scheme of the kingdom. 
Enter the hypothetical legislature.  The hypothetical legislature identifies 
a new substance to control:  the betel nut.
4
  The commission is therefore faced 
with creating an offense guideline for betel nut distribution.  Based on its 
wisdom and expertise, the commission finds that the ideal measure of offense 
seriousness is the quantity of betel nut distributed by the offender.
5
  Thus, in 
  
 3. For the guidelines to be “right” or for ranges to be “proper,” the commission 
must subscribe to one or more sentencing theories that its guidelines effectively carry 
out.  The specific policy views of this hypothetical commission are not important – 
the salient point is that the pure guidelines represent the commission’s best attempt at 
implementing its own vision for federal sentencing, whatever that vision may be. 
 4. For general background on the history, usage, effects, risks, and non-
criminalization of the betel nut, see TODD A. THIES, LEGALLY STONED: 14 MIND-
ALTERING SUBSTANCES YOU CAN OBTAIN AND USE WITHOUT BREAKING THE LAW 85-
90 (2009). 
 5. Here, the hypothetical commission has parted way with the many commenta-
tors who have long criticized the use of controlled substance quantity as an accurate 
 
2
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its pure offense guideline, the commission correlates the offense level with 
the quantity of nuts distributed.  Figure 1 displays the commission’s pure 





The x-axis represents the quantity of nuts distributed.  The y-axis repre-
sents the mean number of months within the guidelines range for an offender 




proxy for offense seriousness.  See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentenc-
ing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 915 (1991) 
(“Sentencing commissions can quantify harms more easily than they can quantify 
circumstances.  Commissions count the stolen dollars, weigh the drugs, and forget 
about more important things.”); David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real 
Offense Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 
452-53 (1993) (opining that the quantity for many offenses – including larceny, fraud, 
and narcotics offenses – “is often beyond the defendant’s control or expectations” and 
arguing that quantity-driven offense guidelines give law enforcement the ability to 
manipulate sentences through suggesting higher quantities in undercover operations).  
See generally Eric L. Sevigny, Excessive Uniformity in Federal Drug Sentencing, 25 
J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 155 (2009) (finding that quantity-driven sentencing 
results in excessively uniform sentences for offenders with highly dissimilar roles in 
the offense).  Neither this hypothetical nor this Article is meant to weigh the relative 
merits (or lack thereof) of quantity-based offense guidelines.  For purposes of the 
hypothetical, it is best to accept that the hypothetical commission has judged that 
quantity correlates perfectly to offense seriousness for betel nut distribution without 
probing deeper into the assumptions underlying that judgment. 
 6. The (hypothetical) data underlying Figure 1 may be found in Table 1 of Ap-
pendix A.  The data is identical to the quantities and corresponding offense levels in 
the (real) offense guideline applicable to the distribution of ketamine.  See U.S. 








Figure 1: Mean Sentence for Betel Nut Distribution 
Under "Pure" Offense Guideline 
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Influenced by “political considerations,” the hypothetical legislature 
places statutory limitations on sentencing betel nut distributers that are out of 
alignment with the commission’s pure guidelines.  Specifically, the legisla-
ture sets a statutory minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment for the 
distribution of 10,000 nuts and a statutory minimum sentence of ten years’ 
imprisonment for the distribution 400,000 nuts.  Under the commission’s pure 
offense guidelines, the distribution of 10,000 nuts should yield a range of 21 
to 27 months’ imprisonment for a defendant in criminal history category I.  
The distribution of 400,000 nuts should yield a range of 78 to 97 months’ 
imprisonment for a defendant with the same minimal criminal history. 
With statutory minimums higher than the commission’s judgment of the 
proper punishment for the distribution of betel nuts, the commission must 
elect from three options: (1) elevate the entire betel nut offense guideline by 
proportionately extrapolating the legislatively-sanctioned punishment levels; 
(2) incorporate the statutory limits into the guideline as “cliffs,” but otherwise 
keep the guideline as close to the pure guideline as possible; or (3) make no 
changes to the pure offense guideline but allow another guideline provision to 
ensure that a defendant’s ultimate guidelines range of imprisonment conforms 
to the statutory limits on sentencing. 
The first option, the “wholesale extrapolation approach,” would produce 




 7. In simplified terms, under the (real) Guidelines the seriousness of the offense 
conduct is graded on a scale of 1 to 43 (the “offense level”) and the offender’s recent 
past criminal history is graded on a scale of I to VI (the “criminal history category”).  
The intersection of those two numbers in the Guidelines’ Sentencing Table discloses 
the offender’s advisory range of imprisonment.  See id. ch. 5, pt. A; see also U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 
available at www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/Over- 
view_Federal_Sentencing_Guidelines.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2013).   
  At the left end of the betel nut pure offense guideline graph, a distribution of 
1 to 249 nuts results in an offense level of six, with a guidelines range of 0 to 6 
months’ imprisonment for an offender in criminal history category I.  Thus, the graph 
displays three months’ imprisonment for a distribution of 1 to 249 nuts.  A distribu-
tion of 250 to 999 nuts leads to offense level eight, with the same 0 to 6 month guide-
lines range (mean of 3 months).  One thousand to 2500 nuts leads to offense level ten 
and a guidelines range of 6 to 12 months (mean of 9 months).  And so on up the graph 
until the distribution of 30,000,000 or more nuts leads to an offense level of 235 to 
293 months’ imprisonment (mean of 264 months). 
 8. The (hypothetical) data underlying Figure 2 is reproduced in Table 2 of  
Appendix A. 
4
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Under the wholesale extrapolation approach, the curve of incremental 
punishment for incremental additional quantity is retained; however, the 
quantities necessary to trigger greater punishments are significantly lower 
than the quantities necessary to trigger identical punishments under the pure 
guideline.  Such ballooning is necessary to incorporate the statutory mini-
mums and maintain a relatively gentle slope.  For example, under the pure 
guideline, a distribution of 5,000 nuts was necessary to receive a guidelines 
range of 15 to 21 months’ incarceration, but under the wholesale extrapola-
tion approach a distribution of only 750 nuts will land an offender in the same 
guidelines range.
9
  On the high end, the pure guideline required a distribution 
of at least 30,000,000 nuts to reach the maximum offense level.  Under the 
wholesale extrapolation approach, a significantly smaller distribution – 
3,000,000 nuts – will place an offender at the top of the graph. 
Rather than extrapolate the statutory minimums wholesale across every 
distribution quantity, under the second option, referred to as the “cliffs ap-
proach,” the commission could opt to incorporate the statutory minimums 
into the pure offense guideline as anomalous cliffs.  Each cliff is followed by 
a similarly anomalous plateau until the gradual curve of the pure guideline 
catches up to the level of the cliff.
10
  This approach, set forth in Figure 3, 
  
 9. Assuming that the defendant is in criminal history category I. 
 10. The metaphor of “posts and lattices” has also been applied to this structure: if 
mandatory minimum sentences are posts and the overall guideline grid is a lattice, 
“long minimum sentences poke through the lattice and when they are very long, tower 
above it.”  MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 97 (1996).  Under the wholesale 
extrapolation approach, “the entire lattice is lifted, as if the mandatory minimums 
were posts, and the sentences for many crimes not covered by the mandatory provi-


















































































Figure 2: Mean Sentences for Betel Nut 
Distribution Under  
Wholesale Extrapolation Approach 
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keeps as true to the pure guideline as possible while incorporating the manda-





For a better sense of the relative effects of the wholesale extrapolation 





 11. The (hypothetical) data underlying Figure 3 is reproduced in Table 3 of Ap-
pendix A.  The offense level that would produce the least severe Guidelines range for 
a defendant in criminal history category I that encompassed the mandatory minimum 
sentence was selected as the applicable offense level.  Thus, offense level twenty-
four, which produces a Guidelines range of 51-63 months’ imprisonment for a de-
fendant in criminal history category I, was selected to capture the five year mandatory 
minimum.  Offense level thirty, which produces a Guidelines range of 97-121 months 
for a defendant in criminal history category I, was selected to capture the ten year 
mandatory minimum. 
 12. Although the data sets underlying Figure 4 are identical to those used in the 
previous figures, the visual representation of the data has been slightly modified.  The 
curves in Figure 4 are not as smooth as in the previous graphs because the wholesale 
extrapolation approach utilizes different quantity thresholds than the other two ap-
proaches.  Thus, Figure 4 includes additional quantity threshold (particularly at lower 
quantity levels), thereby creating the visual appearance of plateaus that do not appear 








Figure 3: Mean Sentence for Betel Nut Distribution 
Under "Cliffs" Approach 
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The commission’s final option is simply to retain its pure betel nut of-
fense guideline.  To ensure that a defendant’s ultimate guidelines range com-
ports with the mandatory minimum provisions, however, a separate guideline 




III.  THE COMMISSION’S APPROACH TO MANDATORY MINIMUMS 
Return, at least for a moment, from the hypothetical black-and-white 
land of pure guidelines and meddling legislatures to our more nuanced federal 




 13. In the (real) federal system, this guideline already exists in the form of sec-
tion 5G1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual.  See infra notes 54-56 and 
accompanying text. 
 14. Seven of the twenty-three offenses set out in the 1790 Crimes Act carried 
mandatory minimum penalties of death.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 7 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT].  Three of the 
offenses still carry mandatory minimum penalties today, although none require man-
datory death.  Id. at 7-8 (treason, murder, and piracy).  Congress first mandated a 
minimum term of incarceration in the Sedition Act of 1798.  Id. at 9.  By the late 19th 
century, nearly one hundred federal offenses carried mandatory minimum penalties.  
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The Commission has openly recognized that mandatory minimums are, 
in “numerous” respects, “both structurally and functionally at odds with sen-
tencing guidelines and the goals the guidelines seek to achieve.”
16
  In its 1991 
Report to Congress on Mandatory Minimums, the Commission identified 
three aspects of mandatory minimum sentences that “starkly conflict” with 
sentencing guidelines: (1) by focusing on a single indicator of offense seri-
ousness, mandatory minimums impose a “tariff effect” that inhibits individu-
alized tailoring of sentences based on offender characteristics and offense 
conduct; (2) mandatory minimums create a “cliff effect” by sharply increas-
ing the punishment based upon small differences in offense conduct or crimi-
nal record; and (3) mandatory minimums are a form of charge-offense sen-
tencing because they are generally effective only when the relevant infor-
mation is included in the charging document, whereas the Guidelines operate 
under a modified real-offense approach to sentencing.
17
  The Commission 
concluded in its 1991 Mandatory Minimum Report, “[A]ll of the intended 
purposes of mandatory minimums can be equally or better served by      
guidelines, without compromising the crime control goals to which Congress 
has evidenced its commitment.”
18
  Clearly, the Commission feels that exter-





 15. See id. at app. A (listing 194 statutory provisions requiring mandatory terms 
of imprisonment).  But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 
28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 201 (1993) (noting that “[t]he great majority of these 
mandatories are seldom or never used”). 
 16. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 26 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT]. 
 17. Id. at 26-33.  In a charge-offense system, a defendant’s sentence is deter-
mined entirely upon the offense of conviction while, in a real-offense system, the 
sentence is determined based upon all surrounding facts regardless of the relation 
between the facts and the offense of conviction.  See Julie R. O’Sullivan, In Defense 
of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense System, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
1342, 1344-45 (1997).  In calibrating the Guidelines, the Commission adopted a com-
promise system, a “modified real-offense system,” that contains some charge-based 
constraints but also requires the consideration of “real” facts beyond the charged 
offense like the offender’s criminal history and relevant conduct.  See id. at 1348-49; 
see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compro-
mises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1988). 
 18. 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 16, at 34. 
 19. The Commission’s 2011 Mandatory Minimum Report backed off its earlier 
language to some extent and focused on providing specific recommendations to   
Congress regarding the operation of individual mandatory minimum provisions,  not 
only based upon the reality that mandatory minimums have become further en-
trenched in the federal criminal code, but also based on “a spectrum of views among 
 
8
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The tariff effect of mandatory minimum sentences creates unwarranted 
uniformity by focusing on a single characteristic of the offense or offender to 
the exclusion of all other characteristics.
20
  Thus, dissimilar offenders are 
treated similarly – or, in many cases, identically – at sentencing by receiving 
sentences at or near the mandatory minimum.
21
  In order to reduce the tariff 
effect, the Commission considered setting the bottom of a guideline range 
higher than the minimum sentence mandated by statute for that offense con-
duct.
22
  Setting the minimum offense guideline higher than the minimum 
statutory sentence would provide some leeway to allow a less culpable of-
fender to receive an offense level reduction for mitigating circumstances.  
Setting aside room at the bottom of the range to reward less culpable offend-
ers, however, works to elevate the Guidelines ranges for typical and more 
culpable offenders.
23
  The Commission found that this approach resulted in 
Guidelines ranges in typical cases at or near the statutory maximum sen-
tence.
24
  This approach therefore would unfairly treat typical offenders simi-
larly to offenders with aggravating circumstances.
25
  In short, not enough 
room existed between the statutory minimum and maximum for the Commis-
sion to fully distinguish between offenders with mitigating, typical, and ag-
gravating circumstances.  Thus, at least for drug offenses, the Commission 
elected to use the mandatory minimum as the “starting point” for base offense 
levels even though it resulted in typical offenders receiving similar or identi-
cal sentences to offenders deserving less punishment.
26
 
Whereas the tariff effect is concerned with uniform sentences for dispar-
ate offense conduct, the cliff effect concerns significantly different sentences 
for relatively similar offense conduct.
27
  Offenders who happen to just surpass 
  
members of the Commission regarding mandatory minimum penalties.”  2011 
MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 14, at 345.  However, the Commission 
did reaffirm the 1991 Mandatory Minimum Report by stating its uniform belief “that 
a strong and effective sentencing guidelines system best serves the purposes of the 
Sentencing Reform Act.”  Id. 
 20. 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 16, at 27-28. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 29. 
 23. It has been calculated that for Guidelines ranges to truly bottom out at the 
mandatory minimum for the least culpable offenders while preserving the proportion-
ality of the Guidelines, offense levels for all offenders would have to be increased by 
five levels.  BARBARA S. VINCENT & PAUL J. HOFER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., The      
Consequences of Mandatory Minimum Prison Terms: A Summary of Recent Findings 
26 (1994). 
 24. 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 16, at 29. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.; see also 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 14, at 53 
(“The Commission historically has . . . set[] a base offense level for Criminal History 
Category I offenders that corresponds to the first guidelines range on the sentencing 
table with a minimum guideline range in excess of the mandatory minimum.”). 
 27. See 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 16, at 30-31. 
9
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or just fall short of the characteristic required to trigger the mandatory mini-
mum sentence are treated quite differently than offenders on the other side of 
the cliff.
28
  Mandatory minimums, when spaced only at wide intervals, are 
inherently cliff-inducing.
29
  For drug distribution offenses, a certain enumer-
ated drug quantity elevates a mandatory minimum sentence from zero to five 
years while another triggering drug quantity elevates it again to ten years.
30
  
A single gram may be the difference between falling on one side of the cliff 
or the other.  The Commission found that the Guidelines were “unable to 




With respect to controlled substances in particular, Congress enacted a 
scheme of mandatory minimum sentences for certain classes of drug posses-
sion and distribution in the early 1950s.
32
  Congress repealed these mandatory 
minimums in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 
1970.
33
  Federal mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses reemerged 
on a wide scale with the passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and the 
Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.
34
  The Commission has been tasked 
  
 28. Id. 
 29. Each of the forty-three offense levels and six criminal history categories in 
the Guidelines are themselves mini-cliffs, but the Guidelines temper any cliff effect 
by providing for Guidelines ranges that overlap with each adjacent Guidelines range.  
For example, offense level twenty-five and criminal history category I produce a 
range of imprisonment of fifty-seven to seventy-one months.  U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2013).  Increasing either the offense level or the 
criminal history category by one increases the Guidelines range to sixty-three to sev-
enty-eight months.  Id. 
 30. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (Supp. 2011). 
 31. 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 16, at 30-31 (recounting 
that first time offenders who crossed the threshold of possession of five grams of 
crack cocaine went from a statutory maximum sentence of one year to a statutory 
minimum sentence of five years under the version of 21 U.S.C. § 844 then in effect). 
 32. 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 14, at 22.  Even earlier 
mandatory minimum penalties for controlled substance offenses dealt with the unlaw-
ful manufacture or sale of alcohol during prohibition.  Id. at 21. 
 33. Id. at 22. 
 34. Id. at 23-25.  Congress attempted to calibrate the drug quantities necessary to 
trigger the ten year minimum as those attributable to “major traffickers, the manufac-
turers or the heads of organizations” and those necessary to trigger the five year min-
imum as those attributable to “serious traffickers,” that is, “managers of the retail 
level traffic.” H.R. REP. No. 99-845 § 314 (1986), available at 1986 WL 295596 
(Leg.Hist.); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 6 (2002).  The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 repealed 
the minimum sentence applicable to possession of cocaine base and increased the 
threshold quantities of cocaine base necessary to trigger the applicable five and ten 
year minimum sentences for trafficking offenses.  2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 29-31. 
10
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with incorporating mandatory minimums into its controlled substance offense 
guidelines since the promulgation of its first Guidelines Manual in 1987.
35
 
In drafting its drug trafficking guideline,
36
 the Commission based the of-
fense level largely on the quantity of the controlled substance trafficked and 
linked the quantity levels in the guideline to the quantities necessary to trigger 
the five and ten year mandatory minimum sentences required by the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986.
37
  The Commission then “extend[ed] the quantity-
based approach across 17 different levels falling below, between, and above 
the two amounts specified in the statutes.”
38
  Despite adverse testimony from 
judges and commentators,
39
 and the Commission’s own conclusion that drug 
quantity is a poor proxy for culpability,
40
 the Commission persists in employ-
  
 35. See 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 16, at i. 
 36. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (2013).  This guideline       
is also applicable to the manufacture, exportation, or importation of controlled     
substances.  Id. 
 37. The drug quantity table in section 2D1.1 assigns base offense levels based on 
the quantity of the controlled substance so that a distribution of a quantity that triggers 
the five year statutory minimum results in a Guidelines range of 63 to 78 months’ 
imprisonment and a distribution of a quantity that triggers the ten year statutory min-
imum results in a Guidelines range of 121 to 151 months’ imprisonment.  U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT 
OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF 
SENTENCING REFORM 49 (2004) [hereinafter U.S.S.C. FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT]; see 
also 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 14, at 54 (the Guidelines are 
calibrated so that offense levels 26 and 32 correspond to five and ten year mandatory 
minimum sentences). 
 38. U.S.S.C. FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 37, at 49; see also id. at 53 
(“[T]he Commission accommodated the mandatory minimum penalty levels when it 
developed the drug trafficking guideline, so the influence of the [Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act] is both direct when it controls the sentence in an individual case by trumping the 
guidelines, and indirect through its influence on the design of the drug guideline it-
self.”); 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 16, at i (“The Sentencing 
Commission drafted the new guidelines to accommodate these mandatory minimum 
provisions by anchoring the guidelines to them.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Transcript of U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Public Hearing, at 16-17 
(May 27, 2009) (testimony of Hon. Vaughn R. Walker) (“I’m not alone in my concern 
that the use of drug quantity as the chief determining factor in drug sentencing is, I 
think, highly problematic.”); Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Provisions Under Fed-
eral Law Before the United States Sentencing Commission, at 12-14 (May 27, 2010) 
(prepared statement of Stephen J. Schulhofer) (explaining how the concepts of rele-
vant conduct and co-conspirator liability drive up the drug quantities attributable to 
less culpable defendants so that drug quantity does not actually distinguish between 
major and minor actors in drug distribution organizations); see also United States v. 
Dossie, 851 F. Supp. 2d 478, 481 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Drug quantity is a poor proxy 
for culpability generally and for a defendant’s role in a drug business in particular.”). 
 40. See 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 14, at 165-68. 
11
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ing the wholesale extrapolation approach to incorporate mandatory mini-
mums into the drug distribution guideline.
 
 
This policy choice significantly increases drug sentences beyond the 
statutorily-required minimums.
41
  Although no contemporaneous Commis-
sion publication explains why the Commission opted for this approach,
42
 it is 
fairly safe to assume that the Commission was motivated, at least in part, by a 
desire to minimize the cliff effect and further what it saw as “the Sentencing 
Reform Act’s goal of ensuring comparable sentences for similarly-situated 
defendants.”
43
  But by setting the bottom of the applicable Guidelines range 
at or near the statutory minimum sentences,
44
 the Commission’s approach left 




A later Commission publication defended the decision to set base of-
fense levels slightly higher than the mandatory minimum levels in order to 
“permit some downward adjustments for defendants who plead guilty or oth-
erwise cooperate with authorities.”
46
  In the Commission’s view, this decision 
fulfills the statutory mandate that the Guidelines “reflect the general appro-
priateness of imposing a lower sentence that would otherwise be imposed, 
including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a mini-
mum sentence, to take into account a defendant’s substantial assistance.”
47
  
According to the Commission, its approach also fulfills the statutory mandate 
  
 41. U.S.S.C. FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 37, at 54 (reporting that analyses 
have found that approximately twenty-five percent of the average expected prison 
term of seventy-three months for drug offenders sentenced in 2001 “can be attributed 
to guidelines increases above the mandatory minimum penalty levels.”). 
 42. Id. at 49. 
 43. 1991 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 16, at 31; see also U.S.S.C. 
FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 37, at 50 (hypothesizing that a “possible reason for 
the Commission’s approach was to avoid sentencing ‘cliffs.’”).  The Sentencing Re-
form Act directs the Commission to establish policies and practices that avoid “un-
warranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility 
to permit individualized sentences.”  28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2006); see also § 
994(f) (directing the Commission to place special attention on “providing certainty 
and fairness in sentencing and reducing unwarranted sentence disparities”). 
 44. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 45. U.S.S.C. FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 37, at 49 (recognizing that the 
Guidelines’ approach “creates disparity by treating less culpable offenders the same 
as more culpable ones”). 
 46. 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 14, at 54; see also U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 148 (1995) (“The base offense levels are set at guideline ranges 
slightly higher than the mandatory minimum levels to permit some downward ad-
justment for defendants who plead guilty or otherwise cooperate with authorities.”). 
 47. 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 14, at 54 (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 994(n))(internal quotation marks omitted). 
12
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to consider the community’s view of the seriousness of the offense conduct 
because statutory limits on sentencing “reflect Congress’s expression of the 
community view of the gravity of the offense.”
48
 
The Commission does not always follow a uniform approach when in-
corporating mandatory minimum penalties into the Guidelines.
49
  Child por-
nography offenses, for example, are another area in which legislation substan-
tially constrains the Commission’s ability to implement its own judgment in 
authoring guidelines ranges.
50
  However, upon the enactment of a five year 
statutory minimum sentence for child pornography trafficking and receipt 
offenses, the Commission elected to amend the base offense level to 22, even 
though that offense level results in a Guidelines range of only 41 to 51 
months for offenders in the least severe criminal history category.
51
  The 
Commission found this offense level appropriate because it foresaw that en-
hancements applicable in nearly every child pornography case would increase 
the offense level beyond the five year mandatory minimum.
52
  In other guide-
lines, particularly those in which consecutive sentences are mandated by stat-
ute, the Commission has simply dictated that the Guidelines sentence is the 
minimum term required by statute.
53
 
Statutory limits on sentencing need not be written into offense guide-
lines in order to ensure that offenders’ ultimate Guidelines ranges comport 
with the statutory limits.  As a safeguard backstopping all Guidelines calcula-
tions, section 5G1.1 of the Guidelines ensures that a defendant’s Guidelines 
range never violates any applicable statutory limit on sentencing.
54
  After a 
defendant’s Guidelines range is calculated by inputting her offense level and 
criminal history category into the Sentencing Table,
55
 section 5G1.1 con-
  
 48. Id. (citing § 994(c)(4)). 
 49. See id. at 53 (noting that the Commission’s “methods of incorporating man-
datory minimum penalties into the guidelines have varied over time, with the benefit 
of the Commission’s continuing research, experience, and analysis.”). 
 50. See 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 14, at 27-29; U.S.S.C. 
FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 37, at 72-75. 
 51. See 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM REPORT, supra note 14, at 55. 
 52. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend.          
664 (2013). 
 53. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2K2.4(b), 2A3.6,  
2B1.6 (2013). 
 54. See id. § 5G1.1. 
 55. In simplified terms, a defendant’s offense level is determined through the 
calculation of the Chapter Two offense guideline as altered by the Chapter Three 
adjustments.  See id. § 1B1.1.  The criminal history category is calculated through 
Part A of Chapter Four.  See id. § 4A1.1.  These two figures are then inputted into the 
Sentencing Table contained in Part A of Chapter Five to arrive at the defendant’s 
Guidelines range of imprisonment.  See id. ch. 5, pt. A. 
13
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stricts or alters the Guidelines range to fit within any applicable statutory 
minimum or maximum limit on the sentence.
56
 
IV.  FAIRNESS AND INFORMATIONAL BENEFITS OF  
PURE OFFENSE GUIDELINES  
The wholesale extrapolation approach adopted by the Commission is not 
necessary to implement the expressed will of the legislature.  The legisla-
ture’s will is only expressed in legislation – that is, the actual statutory limits 
on sentencing that have been enacted into law.  If the legislature desired a 
smooth upward curve of punishment based on a specific offense characteris-
tic, it could have provided for one through additional mandatory minimum 
sentences or through a directive to the Commission to fill out a curve.
57
  But, 
other than the scant data points set out by mandatory minimum legislation, 
the will of the legislature as it relates to the punishment of various federal 
offenses is unknown.
58
  Presuming otherwise is a dangerous supposition. 
Thus, the Commission is left to promulgate Guidelines, within the statu-
tory constraints of its discretion, that best guide sentencing courts to the im-
position of just punishment.  The primary focus in guideline promulgation 
should be achieving actual fairness for defendants.  Because pure offense 
guidelines are, by definition, the Commission’s best approximation of just 
punishment, the Commission should deviate from pure offense guidelines 
only to the extent necessary to comply with legislative directives.  Secondary 
benefits of pure offense guidelines include communicating the Commission’s 
disagreement with certain mandatory minimum sentences to other stakehold-
ers in the federal sentencing system.  But the overriding focus of guideline 
drafting should be to achieve actual fairness in sentencing rather than relative 
fairness or any secondary concerns. 
  
 56. When a defendant is sentenced on multiple counts of conviction, a recent 
amendment to the Guidelines mandates that a mandatory minimum applicable to any 
of the counts increases the floor of the Guidelines range applicable to all of the 
counts.  See id. § 5G1.2(b) & cmt. n.3; see also Kevin Bennardo, Sweeping Up Guide-
line Floors: The Misguided Policy of Amendment 767 to the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines Manual, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 60, 63 (2013). 
 57. Congress has previously directly instructed the Commission regarding the 
appropriateness of certain Guidelines ranges.  See Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Con-
gress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 185, 196 (1993); see also U.S.S.C. FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT, supra note 
37, at 72-73 (recounting direct amendment of the Guidelines by Congress through the 
PROTECT Act of 2003). 
 58. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 103 (2007) (Statutory mini-
mum and maximum sentences say “nothing about the appropriate sentence within 
these brackets, and we decline to read any implicit directive into that congressional 
silence.”). 
14
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A.  Actual, Not Relative, Fairness 
In crafting the Guidelines, the Commission is generally tasked with as-
signing a fair punishment – or range of punishments – for certain offense 
conduct given certain offender characteristics.
59
  A sentence’s “fairness” can 
be viewed through the lens of either relative fairness or actual fairness.  Rela-
tive fairness measures how much a given sentence deviates from sentences of 
similarly-situated offenders.  Actual fairness measures how much a given 
sentence deviates from the objective “right” sentence.
60
  While the imposition 
of incremental punishment for incremental wrongdoing is one facet of fair 
punishment, achieving actual fairness will always produce relative fairness, 
but the reverse does not necessarily hold true. 
Actual fairness concerns should trump relative fairness concerns in all 
instances.  No matter how much disparity is created between sentences for 
two similarly-situated offenders, a sentencing entity should always strive to 
impose the “right” sentence on each offender.  It makes little sense, in the 
name of reducing disparity, to anchor the sentence of one offender to an un-
fair sentence of another offender.  As described by one district court judge, 
“[i]t is better to have five good sentences and five bad ones than to have ten 
bad but consistent sentences.”
61
  If an earlier court errs and imposes an incor-
rect sentence that is never rectified, certainly later courts should not follow 
the error for all similarly-situated defendants.  Although imposing the same 
erroneous sentence repeatedly would create relative fairness, the result would 
be a string of consistently unfair sentences. 
The overwhelming drawback of the wholesale extrapolation approach is 
that it substitutes the legislature’s data points for the Commission’s expertise 
as the foundation for the Guidelines range.  These forced data points, based 
on mandatory minimum sentences, undermine the Commission’s efforts to 
promulgate actually fair offense guidelines based on empirical evidence and 
research.
62
  Thus, the resulting offense level determination is likely to deviate 
  
 59. See id. at 109 (noting the Commission’s “characteristic institutional role” is 
to advise sentencing courts based on empirical data and national experience). 
 60. While reasonable minds may differ on what constitutes the “right” sentence, 
all minds should agree that the right sentence is a fair one.   
 61. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Public Hearing, at 3 (Feb. 11, 2009) (prepared 
statement of Robert L. Hinkle, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Florida). 
 62. Justice Breyer, one of the original members of the Sentencing Commission, 
has called for the removal of all mandatory minimums sentences: 
[S]tatutory mandatory sentences prevent the [C]ommission from carrying out 
its basic, congressionally mandated task: the development, in part through re-
search, of a rational, coherent set of punishments . . . .  Congress, in simulta-
neously requiring guideline sentencing and mandatory minimum sentencing, 
is riding two different horses.  And those horses, in terms of coherence, fair-
ness, and effectiveness, are traveling in opposite directions. 
 
15
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substantially from the pure offense guideline.  Because a pure guideline is the 
Commission’s best attempt at writing an actually fair guideline, any deviation 
from it – either on the harsh or lenient side – must be treated as a negative 
from the Commission’s perspective.  For that reason the Commission should 
only diverge from its pure guidelines to the minimum extent possible within 




Stephen Breyer, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines Revisited, Address to the University of Nebraska College of Law, 
Roman L. Hruska Institute (Nov. 18, 1998) in 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 180, 184-85 
(1999). 
 63. Others have previously given voice to this thought, including Professor (and 
recent appointee to the Sentencing Commission) Rachel Barkow:   
[T]he best approach for a commission – unless the legislative body explicitly 
orders otherwise – is to accept legislative judgments based on political factors 
but not to extend them further than the legislature commands if doing so 
would conflict with the commission’s expert judgment . . . [because if] the 
mandatory minimum is not the product of careful study or research, then key-
ing all guidelines to that minimum exacerbates the harms of a failure to reflect 
on the consequences and goes against an agency’s mission to base its deci-
sions on empirical information and studies. 
Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1614 (2012).  Professor Barkow suggests that any cliffs 
resulting from such a sentencing scheme would be justified by the need to reconcile 
Congress’s directives to fashion guidelines that both meet the sentencing mandates of 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) and maintain consistency with federal statutes as required by 
28 U.S.C. § 994.  See id. at 1616. 
  Likewise, judges and commentators have directly urged the Commission to 
reduce the impact of mandatory minimum sentences on the Guidelines.  See Letter 
from the Hon. Paul Cassell, Chair of the Comm. on Criminal Law of the Judicial 
Conference of the U.S., to the Hon. Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair of the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Comm’n, at 1 (Mar. 16, 2007),  available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_ 
and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/20070320/walton-testimony.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (commenting on the guideline amendments in response to 
the passage of the Adam Walsh Child Protection Act of 2006 “that when the Com-
mission is promulgating base offense levels for guidelines used for offenses with 
mandatory minimums, the Commission should set the base offense level irrespective 
of the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment that may be imposed by the stat-
ute.”); U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Public Hearing, at 17 (May 28, 2009) (testimony of 
Hon. Vaughn R. Walker) (“Statutory minimums, of course, inevitably create . . . 
cliffs.  But the Commission should not aggravate the problematic character of these 
minimums by conforming sentences not subject to statutory minimums to these same 
features.”); U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Public Hearing, at 29 (May 27, 2010) (prepared 
statement of Michael Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of 
Virginia) (urging the Commission “to review the guidelines presently linked to man-
datory minimums and set guideline levels based on data and research.”); U.S. Sen-
tencing Comm’n Public Hearing, at 5 (May 27, 2010) (prepared statement of Jay 
Rorty, American Civil Liberties Union, Center for Justice) (urging the Commission 
“to eliminate the ripple effects of mandatory minimums throughout the guideline 
system by abandoning offense levels that are calibrated to mandatory minimums.”); 
 
16
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A second drawback of the wholesale extrapolation approach is its failure 
to effectively reduce relative unfairness.  In quantity-driven offense guide-
lines, relative fairness cuts both ways: offenders responsible for similar quan-
tities should receive similar offense levels while offenders responsible for 
dissimilar quantities should receive dissimilar offense levels.  In a quantity-
driven offense guideline, utilizing the cliffs approach to incorporate a manda-
tory minimum produces relative unfairness along the middle of the offense 
guideline’s punishment curve in two ways: (1) offenders immediately on 
either side of a cliff receive dissimilar offense levels despite accountability 
for similar quantities; and (2) offenders along the plateau to the right of a cliff 
receive similar offense levels despite responsibility for dissimilar quantities.
64
  
Despite its relatively smooth upward curve, the wholesale extrapolation ap-
proach contains significant relative unfairness as well.  The relative unfair-
ness, however, is pushed to the top of the curve.  By plateauing earlier, the 
wholesale extrapolation model works substantial relative unfairness by failing 
to differentiate between offenders responsible for large-but-dissimilar quanti-
ties.
65
  Although the curve is relatively smooth in the middle, the wholesale 
extrapolation model simply shifts the unfairness out of the middle of the 
curve and into the margins.  Thus, the wholesale extrapolation approach re-
tains significant unwarranted uniformity; such unwarranted uniformity is 




see also Schulhofer, Prepared Statement, supra note 39, at 28 (calling for the Com-
mission to maintain Guidelines keyed to the quantity-based mandatory minimums, but 
to not take drug quantity any further into account in drafting the controlled substance 
guidelines beyond the levels prescribed by the mandatory minimums). 
 64. In the betel nut hypothetical, the cliffs approach created relative unfairness in 
two places in the middle of the curve corresponding to the triggering quantities of the 
two mandatory minimum sentences.  See supra Figure 3. 
 65. Applying the wholesale extrapolation approach to the betel nut hypothetical 
resulted in the imposition of identical offense levels on all offenders who distributed 
more than 3,000,000 nuts.  See supra Figure 2.  But under the pure betel nut offense 
guideline, a distribution of ten times that quantity was necessary to reach the maxi-
mum offense level.  See supra Figure 1. 
 66. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (describing the tariff effect of 
mandatory minimum sentences).  Numerous commentators have noted the troubling 
nature of excessive uniformity.  See Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 
supra note 15, at 210-11; Schulhofer, Prepared Statement, supra note 39, at 10 (ex-
cessive uniformity “often is even more troubling” than sentencing disparities in the 
punishment of similarly situated offenders); U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Public Hearing, 
at 10 (May 27, 2010) (prepared statement of James E. Felman, American Bar Associ-
ation) (“Treating unlike offenders identically is as much a blow to rational sentencing 
policy as is treating similar offenders differently.”). 
17
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B.  Communicative and Informational Benefits of Pure Guidelines 
Pure offense guidelines inform stakeholders in the federal sentencing 
process of the Commission’s unmitigated judgment regarding the appropriate 
punishment for certain offense conduct given certain offender characteristics.  
Congress could use this information when considering whether to craft or 
amend statutory limits on sentencing.
67
  Sentencing courts could use this in-
formation when deciding whether to impose a mandatory minimum sentence 
or a more severe one.  But by inserting statutory limits on sentencing directly 
into the offense guidelines, the wholesale extrapolation approach cloaks the 
Commission’s true judgment regarding appropriate punishment.  Similarly, 
the cliffs approach obscures the Commission’s judgment behind each cliff in 
the offense guideline. 
Such obfuscation inappropriately causes the Commission to absorb 
some of the blame for the harshness of Congress’s mandatory minimum pen-
alties.
68
  In a world of pure offense guidelines that are not linked to mandato-
ry minimum penalties, some members of the community and more than a few 
defendants may be disillusioned to learn that the Commission’s research and 
expertise would support a more lenient sentence than the mandatory mini-
mum.  A defendant sentenced under a ten-year mandatory minimum would 
likely feel wronged upon learning that the Commission would deem the   
appropriate sentence to be in the range of 78 to 87 months.  It is simply not 
the function of the Commission to put up a smokescreen to shield the legisla-
ture from customer dissatisfaction with its sentencing statutes.  Moreover, 
pure guidelines could be appropriately illuminating to the community and 
prompt further pressure on Congress to amend statutory limits to fall more   
in line with the Commission’s judgments.  If the Commission simply writes 
mandatory minimums into the offense guidelines, as it currently does with   
the controlled substance guideline, no view other than the statutorily-imposed 
one is present.  This approach inevitably leads to offense guidelines that     
the Commission cannot defend and public dissatisfaction with the work of  





 67. See Barkow, supra note 63, at 1617. 
 68. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Anonymous Hacks USSC Website to Avenge 
Aaron Schwartz’s Suicide, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Jan. 26, 2013, 12:08 PM), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2013/01/anonymous-
hacks-ussc-website-to-avenge-aaron-swartzs-suicide.html (noting that the Commis-
sion’s website may not have been the most fitting target for the hackers’ protest). 
 69. The Commission has been urged to “reject sentences where it cannot provide 
an empirical basis and an articulable justification for the sentences that it recom-
mends.”  Transcript of U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Public Hearing, supra note 39, at 22 
(in reference to the Drug Quantity Table of U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
2D1.1(c)). 
18
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V.  DELINKING CHAPTER TWO OFFENSE GUIDELINES FROM 
STATUTORY LIMITS 
The Commission is statutorily-mandated to promulgate Guidelines that 
are “consistent with all pertinent provisions of any Federal statute.”
70
  This 
Congressional directive, however, requires only that the ultimate output of the 
Guidelines – an offender’s Guidelines range – conform to federal law.  Thus, 
the focus of the conformity should be on the final sentencing range calculated 
through the Guidelines, not on each individual offense guideline. 
Because section 5G1.1 ensures that a defendant’s ultimate Guidelines 
range will comply with all applicable statutory limits,
71
 the Commission need 
not incorporate mandatory minimums or maximums into Chapter Two of-
fense guidelines.
72
  To maximize actual fairness, the decision of whether to 
embed a statutory limit on sentencing into an offense guideline should be 
dictated by whether defendants sentenced under the offense guideline are 
always subject to the mandatory minimum provided that the triggering char-
acteristic is present.  If not, then permitting a mandatory minimum sentence 
to skew the entire offense guideline for all defendants works actual unfairness 
for those defendants not subject to the mandatory minimum.  In those cases, 
the Chapter Two offense guideline should be left pure and section 5G1.1 is 
the proper tool to increase the Guidelines range as needed to comport with the 
mandatory minimum applicable to a particular defendant.  The next sub-part 
explains the avenues through which a federal defendant convicted of a con-
trolled substance offense may avoid the operation of an otherwise applicable 
mandatory minimum.  The final sub-part concludes that the drug distribution 
guideline should be revised into a “pure guideline” in order to better guide 
district courts when sentencing controlled substance offenders who have 
avoided the operation of mandatory minimum penalties. 
A.  Mechanisms of Mandatory Minimum Avoidance 
A defendant charged with a federal drug distribution offense may avoid 
the operation of an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum through three 
  
 70. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2006); see also § 994(b)(1) (Guidelines ranges must be 
“consistent with all pertinent provisions of title 18, United States Code”); United 
States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997) (the Commission’s broad discretion in 
formulating Guidelines must “bow to the specific directives of Congress”). 
 71. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text. 
 72. Indeed, the Commission already takes this approach with respect to some 
infrequently applied mandatory minimums.  See 2011 MANDATORY MINIMUM 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 56.  The Commission accounts for other statutory limits 
outside of the Chapter Two offense guidelines.  See id. at 57-58 (explaining that the 
fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence for possession of a firearm after three vio-
lent felony or serious drug convictions is reflected in the Chapter Four Armed Career 
Criminal guideline rather than the Chapter Two offense guideline). 
19
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distinct avenues: (1) providing substantial assistance to the government; (2) 
meeting the requirements of the “safety valve”; or (3) having the prosecution 
fail to charge the triggering drug quantity in the indictment or prove it beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  As explained below, the Commission should promulgate 
a pure drug trafficking guideline to facilitate fair sentencing of offenders who 
avoid statutorily-imposed mandatory minimum sentences through the latter 
two avenues. 
1.  Substantial Assistance 
A defendant who provides substantial assistance to the government may 
avoid a mandatory minimum penalty either through 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) or 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b).
73
  Under both mechanisms, the 
government holds the power – checked by the bounds of constitutional mo-
tives – to decide whether to bring a motion to reduce the sentence below the 




Subsection 3553(e) authorizes a district court, upon a motion by the 
government, to impose a sentence below the statutorily-required minimum at 
the defendant’s original sentencing hearing.
75
  Motions premised on this sub-
  
 73. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006) (“Upon motion of the Government, the court 
shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a 
minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance . . . .”); FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 35(b) (“[T]he court may reduce a sentence if the defendant, after sentencing, 
provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person.”). 
 74. See Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 125-26 (1996) (“We believe 
that § 3553(e) requires a Government motion requesting or authorizing the district 
court to ‘impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence’ 
before the court may impose such a sentence.”); Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 
185-86 (1992) (holding that section 3553(e) grants the government “a power, not a 
duty, to file a motion when a defendant has substantially assisted,” but that “federal 
district courts have authority to review a prosecutor’s refusal to file a substantial-
assistance motion and to grant a remedy if they find that the refusal was based on an 
unconstitutional motive”); see also United States v. Roe, 445 F.3d 202, 207-08 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (noting that “where a plea agreement provides that government will file a 
[section 3553(e)] motion if it determines that the defendant has provided substantial 
assistance,” the government must act in good faith in exercising its discretion to file 
such a motion).  
       Although often lauded for providing some relief from mandatory minimum 
penalties, these provisions create what has been termed a “cooperation paradox”: 
more culpable offenders are likely to be in a better position to render substantial assis-
tance to the government and be relieved of harsh mandatory minimums while less 
culpable and less knowledgeable defendants are likely to be sentenced under the 
mandatory minimum regime.  See Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 
supra note 15, at 211-13. 
 75. § 3553(e). 
20
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section reflect the defendant’s substantial assistance to the government “in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an of-
fense.”
76
  Rule 35(b) provides a mechanism through which to reduce a sen-
tence after its imposition.
77
  In order for a defendant to receive the benefit of a 
post-sentencing Rule 35(b) motion, the government must generally move the 
court within one year of sentencing for a reduction of the defendant’s sen-
tence.
78
  The rule provides that “the court may reduce the sentence to a level 
below the minimum sentence established by statute.”
79
   
The federal courts of appeals almost universally hold that a successful 
motion to reduce sentence under either mechanism permits the district court 
to consider only the defendant’s assistance in calculating the extent of the 
sentence reduction below the mandatory minimum.
80
  A successful motion 
does not permit the sentencing court to consider all of the 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a) factors in fashioning a sentence below the statutory minimum.
81
  This 
limitation is clear from the face of subsection 3553(e), which grants the dis-
trict court “the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by 
statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assis-
tance.”
82
  Federal courts uniformly interpret subsection 3553(e) in this way 
and only consider the defendant’s assistance to the government in calculating 




 76. Id. 
 77. Rule 35(a), which does not grant authority to deviate below a manda-       
tory minimum, authorizes a district court to correct a sentence within fourteen days of 
its imposition based on “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.”  FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 35(a). 
 78. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)(1).  For limited types of assistance, the rule permits 
for a reduction of sentence upon a motion by the government made more than one 
year after the defendant’s sentencing.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)(2) (in each of the excep-
tions, either the defendant or the government must be unaware of the information or 
its usefulness until after the one year deadline). 
 79. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)(4). 
 80. See infra notes 83, 87 and accompanying text. 
 81. Subsection 3553(a) lists a variety of factors that district courts must consider 
in imposing sentences, such as the need for the sentence to provide just punishment, 
afford adequate deterrence, and protect the public from further crimes of the defend-
ant.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2006) (emphasis added).  The subsection’s title – “Lim-
ited authority to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum” – also counsels 
against permitting district courts to reduce the defendant’s sentence below the statuto-
ry minimum based on non-assistance factors.  Id. 
 83. See, e.g., United States v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 62 (1st Cir. 2002); United 
States v. Richardson, 521 F.3d 149, 159 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Winebarger, 
664 F.3d 388, 392-96 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Hood, 556 F.3d 226, 234 n.2 
(4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Desselle, 450 F.3d 179, 182 (5th Cir. 2006); United 
States v. Williams, 687 F.3d 283, 285-88 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Johnson, 
580 F.3d 666, 672-73 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130, 
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The text of Rule 35(b) is less straightforward.  The text states only that 
“the court may reduce a sentence” if the defendant provides substantial assis-
tance to the government; it does not explicitly limit the factors that the district 
court may consider in reducing the sentence.
84
  Before a 2002 amendment to 
the rule that was “intended to be stylistic only,”
85
 the language of Rule 35(b) 
was similar to that of subsection 3553(e): it conferred upon the court the au-
thority to reduce the sentence “to reflect a defendant’s subsequent, substantial 
assistance.”
86
  After the amendment, most federal courts of appeals that have 
considered the issue hold that a district court still may not increase a defend-
ant’s reduction pursuant to Rule 35(b) for any reason unrelated to the defend-
ant’s assistance to the government.
87
  This result is sensible because the gov-
ernment would be disincentivized from making Rule 35(b) motions if such 
motions led to a full-blown resentencing during which the district court was 
free to consider any and all factors.
88
  Only the Ninth Circuit permits district 
courts to increase the extent of a defendant’s sentence reduction based on 
factors unrelated to the defendant’s assistance to the government.
89
  The 
Ninth Circuit held, however, that resentencing upon the grant of a Rule 35(b) 
motion “is not the equivalent of a de novo sentencing.”
90
  The district court 
must use the original sentence as the “starting point” and may consider     
non-assistance factors only “in combination with the amount of assistance       
rendered by the defendant.”
91
  Thus, while a defendant may escape the      
operation of an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentence by 
providing substantial assistance to the government, the defendant’s sentence 
remains meaningfully tied to the mandatory minimum as the departure point 
for the reduction. 
  
1130-32 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jackson, 577 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 
2009); United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1281-85 (10th Cir. 2008); United States 
v. Mangaroo, 504 F.3d 1350, 1355-56 (11th Cir. 2007).  
 84. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)(1), (b)(4). 
 85. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 advisory committee’s note on the 2002 Amendment. 
 86. See United States v. Poland, 562 F.3d 35, 37-38 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing 
the evolution of Rule 35(b)). 
 87. See United States v. Grant, 636 F.3d 803, 809-15 (6th Cir. 2011) (en banc); 
Poland, 562 F.3d at 41; United States v. Shelby, 584 F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 2009).  
But in what has been called a “one-way ratchet,” district courts are generally author-
ized to take non-assistance factors into account when determining whether to limit the 
size of the sentence reduction.  See United States v. Davis, 679 F.3d 190, 196-97 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). 
 88. See Shelby, 584 F.3d at 746-47. 
 89. See United States v. Tadio, 663 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 90. Id. at 1055. 
 91. Id. 
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2.  The “Safety Valve” 
The “safety valve” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) relieves the least 
culpable defendants convicted of drug distribution offenses from the opera-
tion of mandatory minimum sentences.
92
  For a defendant to qualify for the 
safety valve, the court must find that: (1) the defendant has no more than one 
criminal history point under the Guidelines; (2) the defendant did not possess 
a firearm or other dangerous weapon or use violence or a credible threat of 
violence in connection with the offense; (3) the offense did not result in death 
or serious injury; (4) the defendant did not have a supervisory role in the of-
fense; and (5) by the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has pro-
vided the government with all information and evidence the defendant has 
concerning the offense.
93
  The defendant bears the burden of proving each of 
the safety valve requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.
94
  Upon 
finding the safety valve requirements fulfilled, the district court is wholly 
unbridled from the mandatory minimum and “shall impose a sentence pursu-
ant to the guidelines . . . without any regard to any statutory minimum sen-
tence.”
95
  Thus, the mandatory minimum sentence plays no role in determin-
ing the sentence for defendants who meet the safety valve’s requirements.
96
 
3.  Failure to Charge or Adequately Prove Triggering Drug Quantities 
The prosecutor must plead the quantity of the controlled substance in the 
indictment and prove the quantity beyond a reasonable doubt in order to trig-
  
 92. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2006).  The safety valve is available to defendants con-
victed under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 846, 960, and 963.  Id. 
 93. Id.  Two bills currently before Congress would expand the scope of the safe-
ty valve.  See Justice Safety Valve Act of 2013, S. 619, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013); 
Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013, S. 1410, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013).  Because neither 
has been enacted into law, this article addresses only the current safety valve provi-
sion contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. Tate, 630 F.3d 194, 202 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Montes, 381 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. O’Dell, 247 
F.3d 655, 675 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 95. § 3553(f). 
 96. See United States v. Quirante, 486 F.3d 1273, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Be-
cause a mandatory minimum sentence that must be disregarded under § 3553(f) is not 
a § 3553(a) factor, it cannot be considered in any part of the sentencing decision when 
the safety valve applies.”); United States v. Cadenas-Juarez, 469 F.3d 1331, 1334-35 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that when the safety valve applies, district courts must take 
the advisory Guidelines into account and impose a sentence without regard for the 
mandatory minimum); United States v. Jeffers, 329 F.3d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The 
plain meaning of [the safety valve] provisions limits a court’s discretion to determin-
ing whether or not the statutory criteria have been met; once it has been determined 
that they have, the court is required to disregard any mandatory minimum in imposing 
sentence.”). 
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ger mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking offenses.
97
  The pre-
ceding two subparts of this Article described mechanisms by which an other-
wise applicable mandatory minimum could be avoided at a defendant’s sen-
tencing hearing.  This subpart describes the conceptually distinct situation in 
which the mandatory minimum is not applicable to the defendant despite the 
sentencing judge’s finding that the defendant is responsible for a drug quanti-
ty that would otherwise trigger the mandatory minimum. 
With the exception of the fact of a prior conviction, “[i]t is unconstitu-
tional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that 
increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is 
exposed” or to permit the establishment of such facts by a burden less than 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
98
  Although this guarantee was explained at 
much greater length (and much more famously) in Apprendi v. New Jersey as 
a right secured by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment en-
forceable against the states,
99
 it was first recognized as a guarantee enforcea-
ble by federal defendants in Jones v. United States under the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and trial guarantees of the 
Sixth Amendment.
100
  In its application to the federal system, the Fifth 
Amendment requires that such facts be presented to the grand jury and plead-
ed in the indictment.
101
  Thus, a defendant who is indicted or found guilty of 
violating a federal statute that carries a statutory maximum cannot be sen-
tenced based on aggravating facts found at sentencing to a term of imprison-
ment longer than the statutory maximum. 
The Supreme Court recently held in Alleyne v. United States that the 
same result follows at the bottom of the sentencing range; with the exception 
of the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that raises the floor of the sentencing 
range must likewise be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
102
  The 
Court’s decision in Alleyne explicitly overruled Harris v. United States,
103
 in 
which the Court had previously held that a fact necessary to trigger a manda-
tory minimum need not be presented to the jury but could be found by the 




 97. See infra notes 111-115 and accompanying text. 
 98. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 99. See id. 
 100. 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999). 
 101. Id.  The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has not been con-
strued to include such a presentment and indictment requirement.  See Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 477 n.3.  Despite this difference, general references in this Article to Apprendi 
or its rule should be understood to encompass the federal requirement of indictment 
and presentment to a grand jury. 
 102. 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). 
 103. Id. at 2158. 
 104. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557 (2002).  In the words of the Harris 
plurality, “[i]f the facts judges consider when exercising their discretion within the 
statutory range are not elements, they do not become as much merely because legisla-
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In Alleyne, the Court considered the mandatory minimum penalties ap-
plicable to a defendant convicted of using or carrying a firearm in relation to 
a crime of violence.
105
  Under the statute, the minimum term of incarceration 
increases depending on whether the firearm was simply possessed (five 
years), brandished (seven years), or discharged (ten years).
106
  However, the 
maximum term of imprisonment (life) is identical regardless of which manda-
tory minimum applies.
107
  The jury found the Alleyne defendant guilty of 
using or carrying a firearm, but declined to find that the defendant had bran-
dished a firearm.
108
  At sentencing, the district court found that a preponder-
ance of the evidence supported a finding that the Alleyne defendant was ac-
countable for the brandishing of a firearm.
109
  Accordingly, the district court 
found that the minimum term of incarceration was seven years and sentenced 
the defendant to that term.
110
 
The Alleyne Court held that any “fact that increases a sentencing floor[] 
forms an essential ingredient of the offense.”
111
  As such, these facts trigger 
the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee just the same as facts that       
increase the maximum punishment to which the defendant is exposed.
112
  The 
Court’s holding in Alleyne is the Sixth Amendment mirror to Apprendi: now 
any fact (other than a fact of a prior conviction) that increases either the   
  
tures require the judge to impose a minimum sentence when those facts are found – a 
sentence the judge could have imposed absent the finding.”  Id. at 560. 
 105. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155-56. 
 106. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2006). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2156.  Alleyne participated in a robbery in which his 
accomplice threatened the victim with a gun.  Id. at 2155.  The actual question was 
not whether Alleyne himself brandished a firearm, but whether he was accountable 
for his accomplice’s brandishing. 
 109. Id. at 2156.  In doing so, the district court noted its reluctance at being cast in 
the role of the “reverser” of the jury’s finding.  See Brief for Petitioner, Alleyne, 133 
S. Ct. 2151 (No. 11-9335), 2012 WL 5884834, at *6. 
 110. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 109, at *6.  The Court of Appeals affirmed 
the district court’s finding as constitutionally permissible under Harris.  United States 
v. Alleyne, 457 F. App’x 348, 350 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  Indeed, the criminal 
statute at issue in Alleyne was the same statute at issue in Harris.  The Harris plurality 
found that a “sentencing factor” that increases only the minimum punishment to 
which a defendant is exposed does not implicate constitutional concerns.  Harris v. 
United States 536 U.S. 545, 556 (2002).  The Harris holding reaffirmed the pre-
Apprendi opinion of McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), which the Ap-
prendi Court explicitly noted was beyond the scope of its decision.  See Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 n.13 (2000) (stating that its decision did not overrule 
McMillan because Apprendi did not impact “cases that do not involve the imposition 
of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum for the offense established by 
the jury’s verdict . . . .”). 
 111. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2161. 
 112. Id. at 2161-62. 
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minimum or the maximum potential punishment to which the defendant is 




In the wake of Alleyne, the drug quantity necessary to trigger a mandato-
ry minimum penalty must be pleaded in the indictment and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order for the defendant to be subject to the mandatory 
minimum penalty.
114
  Because the drug quantity is a fact that raises the floor 
of the sentencing range, a quantity-based mandatory minimum penalty cannot 
be triggered unless the necessary drug quantity is pleaded in the indict-
ment.
115
  If no drug quantity is pleaded in the indictment, the defendant will 
be subject to the statutory sentencing range applicable to a defendant who has 
distributed an unspecified quantity of the controlled substance. 
A more detailed description of the federal drug trafficking statute, 21 
U.S.C. § 841, is useful to understand the sentencing impact of Alleyne on 
defendants convicted of federal drug trafficking offenses.  Titled “Unlawful 
acts,” subsection 841(a) defines the outlawed conduct: knowing or intentional 
  
 113. An admission by the defendant is sufficient to satisfy Alleyne and the Sixth 
Amendment because the defendant is free to waive her right to a trial by jury.  See 
United States v. Yancy, 725 F.3d 596, 601 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]hen a defendant 
knowingly admits the facts necessary for a sentence enhancement in the context of a 
plea, simultaneously waiving his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury, no Apprendi 
problem arises.”);  United States v. Harris, No. 12-3875, 2013 WL 5755249, at *1 
(7th Cir. Oct. 24, 2013) (order) (“By pleading guilty and admitting the [drug] amounts 
alleged, [the defendant] waived his right to a jury determination and also established 
those amounts beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 114. United States v. Claybrooks, 729 F.3d 699, 708 (7th Cir. 2013) (“After Al-
leyne, [the defendant’s] mandatory minimum sentence must be determined by         
the drug quantity described in the jury’s special verdict form . . . .  The district judge 
cannot raise the mandatory sentencing floor based on its own determination that     
[the defendant’s] offense involved additional amounts of narcotics beyond those  
determined by the jury.”); see also United States v. Jordan, Nos. 10-13702, 10-13703, 
2013 WL 5345524, at *1 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2013) (per curiam) (holding that         
the district court ran afoul of Alleyne by basing the defendants’ mandatory min-  
imum sentences on a drug quantity found by the judge at sentencing); United States  
v. Mubdi, No. 10-5008, 2013 WL 4517026, at *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2013) (per    
curiam) (same). 
 115. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2159-60 (discussing the longstanding rule that all 
elements of an offense must appear in the indictment).  As the Attorney General in-
structed federal prosecutors after Alleyne, “for a defendant to be subject to a mandato-
ry minimum sentence, prosecutors must ensure that the charging document includes 
those elements of the crime that trigger the statutory minimum penalty.”  Memoran-
dum from Attorney General Eric Holder, Jr. on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sen-
tences and Recidivist Enhancement in Certain Drug Cases to United States Attorneys 
and Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division at 1 (Aug. 12, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.justice.gov/oip/docs/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-
mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 4, 2014) [hereinafter Holder Memorandum]. 
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manufacture, distribution, dispensation, or possession with the intent to do so 
of a controlled or counterfeit substance.
116
  Titled “Penalties,” subsection 
841(b) sets forth ranges of punishment that vary depending on a number of 
aggravating circumstances: the type of controlled substance involved, the 
quantity of the substance, whether the offense occurred after a prior convic-
tion for a felony drug offense had become final, and whether death or serious 
bodily injury resulted from the use of the controlled substance.
117
  These of-
fense characteristics may alter the statutory minimum, the statutory maxi-
mum, or both.  For most schedule I and schedule II controlled substances, the 
statutory penalties (in the absence of death, serious injury, or a prior felony 
drug conviction) increase depending on the quantity of the controlled sub-
stance involved: a term of imprisonment of zero to twenty years for any un-
specified or minimal quantity,
118
 a term of imprisonment of five to forty years 
for an amount over an intermediate specified quantity,
119
 and a term of im-
prisonment of ten years to life for an amount over a higher specified quanti-
ty.
120
  For example, a cocaine distribution conviction of five or more kilo-
grams triggers the lengthiest statutory range, 500 or more grams triggers the 
intermediate statutory range, and less than 500 grams (or an unspecified 
quantity) triggers the lowest statutory range.
121
 
Before Alleyne, the federal courts of appeals were split on the issue of 
whether the minimum punishments in subsection 841(b) could be de-linked 
from the maximum punishments or whether each sentencing range set forth in 
subsection 841(b) was an inviolate whole.
122
  The circuits that permitted 
  
 116. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (Supp. 2011). 
 117. § 841(b).  Subsections 841(b)(1)(A)-(D) set forth the punishments applicable 
to offenses involving schedule I or II controlled substances, subsections (b)(1)(E)(i)-
(iii) set forth the punishments applicable to offenses involving schedule III controlled 
substances, subsection (b)(2) sets forth the punishments applicable to offenses involv-
ing schedule IV controlled substances, and subsection (b)(3) sets forth the punishment 
applicable to offenses involving schedule V controlled substances.  Id.  Within sub-
section 841(b)(1)(A), the statute sets forth the ranges applicable for offenses involv-
ing the distribution of relatively high quantities of eight specific substances.  Id.  Sub-
section 841(b)(1)(B) sets forth the ranges applicable to offenses involving intermedi-
ate quantities of the same eight specific substances.  Id.  Subsection 841(b)(1)(C) sets 
forth the ranges applicable to offenses involving all schedule I and II controlled sub-
stances, as well as to gamma hydroxybutyric acid and a certain quantity of flunitraze-
pam.  Id.  Subsection 841(b)(1)(D) sets forth the ranges applicable to offenses involv-
ing relatively small quantities of marijuana, hashish, or hashish oil.  Id. 
 118. § 841(b)(1)(C). 
 119. § 841(b)(1)(B). 
 120. § 841(b)(1)(A). 
 121. § 841(b)(1)(A)-(C). 
 122. See Benjamin J. Priester, The Canine Metaphor and the Future of Sentencing 
Reform: Dogs, Tails, and the Constitutional Law of Wagging, 60 SMU L. REV. 209, 
250 n.186 (2007); see also Lindsay Calkins, Note, Is Drug Quantity an Element of 21 
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“mixing and matching” among the sentencing ranges held that the failure to 
include a triggering drug quantity in the indictment limited only the ceiling of 
the sentencing range under Apprendi, but permitted the sentencing judge to 
find that the drug quantity increased the mandatory minimum sentence under 
Harris.
123
  Other circuits found that the structure of the statute prohibited 
such mixing and matching among statutory ranges and held that the failure to 
allege a triggering drug quantity in the indictment forbid the sentencing court 




USC § 841(b)? Determining the Apprendi Statutory Maximum, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 
965, 966, 978-85 (2011). 
 123. See United States v. Goodine, 326 F.3d 26, 32-34 (1st Cir. 2003) (even 
though the jury’s verdict authorized a sentence of five to forty years, a minimum 
sentence of twenty years was required based on a judge-found determination of drug 
quantity); United States v. Hernandez, 330 F.3d 964, 980-82 (7th Cir. 2003) (where 
sentencing court relied on a mandatory minimum based on judge-found drug quantity, 
appellate court found no Apprendi error because the sentence actually received by the 
defendant was below the maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict); United States v. 
Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 605 (6th Cir. 2002) (“That the district court considered drug 
quantities established by a mere preponderance in subjecting [the defendant] to a 
mandatory minimum sentence is irrelevant; because the district court remained within 
the confines of § 841(b)(1)(C), [the defendant’s] due process and jury trial rights 
under Apprendi were not offended.”); see also United States v. Clark, 538 F.3d 803, 
811-12 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).  But see United States v. Jackson, 419 F. App’x 666, 
672 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding district court’s use of the “mix-and-match approach” to 
statutory minimums and maximums under subsection 841(b)(1) could not be plain 
error because it remained an open question in the circuit); United States v. Washing-
ton, 558 F.3d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 2009) (reaffirming Clark’s finding of no Apprendi 
error under similar facts, but noting that the “pure statutory question” of whether 
mixing and matching is permissible under subsection 841(b)(1) was an open question 
that had not been squarely confronted by any court). 
 124. See United States v. Gonzalez, 686 F.3d 122, 133 (2d Cir. 2012) (because 
indictment did not sufficiently charge a specific drug quantity, the defendant “should 
have been sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(C), which deals with indeterminate quantities 
of narcotics and which, in [the defendant’s] case, did not require the imposition of a 
minimum prison term.”); United States v. Gonzalez, 420 F.3d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(“Nothing in the structure of [21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)] suggests that these correspond-
ing minimums and maximums, or any of the others prescribed in the statute, can be 
delinked to permit mixing and matching across subsections to create hybrid sentenc-
ing ranges not specified by Congress.”); United States v. Velasco-Heredia, 319 F.3d 
1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he district court erred when it determined by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that because [the defendant] was responsible for more 
than 50 kilograms of marijuana, he must be sentenced pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(B) to a 
minimum of five-years.”); see also United States v. Graham, 317 F.3d 262, 274-75 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (reading subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subsection 841(b)(1) as 
“three separate offenses” and holding that a defendant must be sentenced under a 
particular subparagraph); United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 530 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(stating that defendant “faced no mandatory minimum sentence” where indictment 
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Since Alleyne, however, a defendant’s statutory minimum or maximum 
punishment may not be enhanced based on a drug quantity found by the judge 
at sentencing.
125
  Even if the sentencing judge finds the defendant responsible 
for a drug quantity that would otherwise trigger a higher mandatory minimum 
(and potential maximum) sentence, that finding does not affect the sentencing 
range to which the defendant is exposed.  In order to expose the defendant to 
a higher sentencing range on the basis of drug quantity, the triggering drug 
quantity must be pleaded in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt or included in the guilty plea. 
To illustrate, a jury may find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt of distribution of fifty grams of cocaine, thus authorizing a custodial 
sentence of zero to twenty years.
126
  But, at sentencing, the judge may find by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was actually responsible 
for the distribution of five kilograms of cocaine.  Under the statute, a drug 
distribution of five kilograms of cocaine would trigger a sentencing range of 
ten years to life imprisonment.
127
  But, under Alleyne, the sentencing judge’s 
factual finding at sentencing cannot raise either the minimum or the maxi-
mum sentence.  Thus, the defendant’s sentencing range remains zero to twen-
ty years’ imprisonment despite the sentencing judge’s finding. 
In August 2013, Attorney General Eric Holder directed federal prosecu-
tors to use Alleyne to structure indictments for certain low-level, non-violent 
drug traffickers in such a way so as to avoid the operation of mandatory   
minimum sentences.
128
  According to the Attorney General, the application of 
mandatory minimum penalties on such offenders has resulted in some      
cases in “unduly harsh sentences” that do not “promote public safety, deter-
rence, and rehabilitation.”
129
  By declining to charge drug quantities in the 




made no reference to drug quantity but sentencing court found sufficient drug quanti-
ty to trigger subsection 841(b)(1)(A)). 
 125. See cases cited supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 126. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). 
 127. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II). 
 128. See Holder Memorandum, supra note 115. 
 129. Id. at 1. 
 130. The memorandum directs:  
[P]rosecutors should decline to charge the quantity necessary to trigger a 
mandatory minimum sentence if the defendant meets each of the following 
criteria: 
 The defendant’s relevant conduct does not involve the use of violence, 
the credible threat of violence, the possession of a weapon, the trafficking 
of drugs to or with minors, or the death or serious bodily injury of any 
person; 
 The defendant is not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of 
others within a criminal organization; 
 The defendant does not have significant ties to large-scale drug traf-
ficking organizations, gangs, or cartels; and 
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the executive branch has essentially created its own “safety valve” to       
place additional low-level drug offenders beyond the reach of mandatory 
minimum sentences. 
B.  Pure Offense Guidelines for Drug Distribution Offenses 
Actual fairness demands that if an offender is to be sentenced without 
regard to a mandatory minimum sentence, the Guidelines range for that of-
fense should not incorporate the mandatory minimum in any way.  Neither 
the wholesale extrapolation approach nor the cliffs approach fairly reflects the 
Commission’s expertise when it comes to sentencing such an offender.  Be-
cause the sentences of some defendants convicted of controlled substance 
offenses can be totally unyoked from mandatory minimums either through the 
safety valve or the failure to adequately charge or prove the triggering drug 
quantity, actual fairness demands the promulgation of a pure offense guide-
line to aid in sentencing these defendants. 
Unlike defendants who benefit from a sentence reduction premised on 
substantial assistance to the government, defendants who are eligible for the 
safety valve are sentenced without any regard for the otherwise applicable 
statutory minimum sentences.  Thus, for safety valve defendants, the district 
courts should have the benefit of a pure offense guideline based on the Com-
mission’s approximation of the most fitting sentencing range.  Currently, the 
Guidelines reward controlled substance traffickers or manufacturers who 
meet the safety valve criteria with a reduction of two offense levels.
131
  This 
reduction, however, is only the crudest of approximations of fairness because 
the offense level from which this reduction is taken is still fundamentally 





 The defendant does not have a significant criminal history.  A signifi-
cant criminal history will normally be evidenced by three or more crimi-
nal history points but may involve fewer or greater depending on the na-
ture of any prior convictions. 
Id. at 2. 
 131. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(b)(16), 2D1.11(b)(6) 
(2013).  This two-level reduction is available even to defendants who are not subject 
to a mandatory minimum sentence.  See § 2D1.1 cmt. n.20 (stating that the applicabil-
ity of the reduction “shall be determined without regard to whether the defendant was 
convicted of an offense that subjects the defendant to a mandatory minimum term of 
imprisonment.”); § 2D1.11 cmt. n.7 (noting that the applicability of the reduction 
“shall be determined without regard to the offense of conviction.”); see also United 
States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2006) (listing cases). 
 132. Partially on this basis, Judge John Gleeson of the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York recently lodged a “policy disagreement” with the 
drug trafficking offense guideline in an artfully crafted explanatory memorandum 
apparently directed at the Sentencing Commission.  United States v. Diaz, No. 11-
CR-00821-2 JG, 2013 WL 322243, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013) (mem.) (“[S]afety 
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Defendants who are not actually subject to mandatory minimum sen-
tences are treated even less fairly by the drug distribution guideline.  This 
class of defendants is only growing in the wake of Alleyne and the Attorney 
General’s directive to federal prosecutors to structure indictments to purpose-
fully avoid the operation of mandatory minimum sentences on certain low-
level, non-violent drug offenders.
133
  Because these defendants are not subject 
to quantity-driven mandatory minimum penalties, they should receive the 
benefit of a research-based pure offense guideline that was not extrapolated 
from the mandatory minimum penalties. 
Under the constitutional interpretation set forth in Alleyne, even if a sen-
tencing court holds a defendant accountable for a drug quantity that would 
have otherwise triggered a mandatory minimum sentence, the defendant is 
exempted from the operation of the mandatory minimum unless the triggering 
drug quantity is charged in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.
134
  Therefore, the defendant should not be sentenced under an offense 
guideline that is keyed to the non-applicable mandatory minimum.  Because 
the drug distribution offense guideline is a wholesale extrapolation of the 
drug quantities that trigger the statutory minimums, these offenders’ guide-
lines ranges are often identical to the ranges that would have been applicable 
had they been subject to mandatory minimum sentences.
135
  As a result, the 
relief from the operation of the mandatory minimum means little at sentenc-
ing unless the judge is willing to deviate from the Guidelines.  To combat this 
result, the Attorney General advised federal prosecutors to consider advocat-
ing for below-guidelines sentences for drug offenders to whom mandatory 
minimums do not apply.
136
  Extrapolating the mandatory minimums across 
the drug distribution guideline furthers relative fairness but only at the cost of 
hindering actual fairness.  This approach effectively fuses the Guidelines 
ranges of defendants who are not subject to a mandatory minimum to the 
  
valve relief from a mandatory minimum does no more than relegate the defendant to a 
Guidelines range that matches, and even exceeds, the mandatory minimum.  Even 
with the Commission’s corresponding two-level safety valve adjustment, the defend-
ant still has a range that embraces the mandatory minimum.”). 
 133. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra Part V.A.3. 
 135. Returning to the betel nut hypothetical, a judge may find a defendant ac-
countable for the distribution of 400,000 betel nuts at sentencing.  However, because 
the nut quantity was not pleaded in the indictment (or, alternatively, not found by a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt), the 400,000 nut quantity does not trigger the ten 
year mandatory minimum.  If the ten year mandatory minimum was rotely written 
into the Guidelines (either as a cliff or as a proportional extrapolation), the applicable 
Guidelines range would be 121 to 151 months despite the fact that no statutory mini-
mum actually applied.  This result is problematic because the hypothetical commis-
sion, based on its research and judgment, found that the proper imprisonment range 
applicable to the distribution of 400,000 betel nuts is only 78 to 97 months.  See supra 
Figure 1; infra App. A, Table 1. 
 136. Holder Memorandum, supra note 115, at 3. 
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Guidelines ranges of defendants who are subject to a mandatory minimum.  
But, because the offense guideline was drafted based on mandatory mini-
mums rather than on the Commission’s own judgment, this system sacrifices 
actual fairness to further relative fairness. 
Were all drug offenders relieved of statutorily-mandated minimum sen-
tences, chances are good that the Commission would amend the drug distribu-
tion offense guideline.  Thus, the subset of defendants who are currently re-
lieved of mandatory minimums should receive the benefit of the Commis-
sion’s expertise and be sentenced pursuant to the purest Guidelines possible.  
By tying the drug distribution ranges to statutory limits that may or may not 
actually apply in a given case, the Commission has fallen short of fulfilling its 
duty to promulgate Guidelines that reflect its reasoned judgment.
137
 
Thus, Guidelines section 2D1.1, the offense guideline applicable to of-
fenses involving the manufacture, importation, exportation, or distribution of 
controlled substances, makes a singularly poor candidate for either the whole-
sale extrapolation or cliffs approach.
138
  Because both approaches are keyed 
in some respect to statutory sentencing limits, an offense guideline devised 
under either approach would deviate from the Commission’s best judgment 
regarding the fair punishment for the offense.  Such deviation works actual 
unfairness on defendants who are not subject to the statutory minimum sen-
tence either through the operation of the safety valve or because the drug 
quantity was not sufficiently pleaded in the indictment or proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  To avoid such unfairness, section 2D1.1 should be amend-
ed to reflect the Commission’s independent judgment regarding fair punish-
ment for drug offenders.
139
  That judgment need not replicate Congress’s use 
  
 137. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(A), (C) (2006) (the Commission must establish 
sentencing policies and practice that “assure the meeting of the purposes to sentencing 
set forth in” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the requirement to “provide just punish-
ment for the offense,” and “reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in 
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process”); see also 
Barkow, supra note 63, at 1616-17.  The Commission is also required to “periodically 
review and revise” the Guidelines “in consideration of comments and data coming to 
its attention.”  28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006). 
 138. Section 2D1.1 of the Guidelines is the operative offense guideline for of-
fenders convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)-(3) (manufacture or distribution of 
controlled substances) and 21 U.S.C. § 960(a), (b) (importation or exportation of 
controlled substances).  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. A (2013). 
 139. Admittedly, a drawback of a pure section 2D1.1 offense guideline is that 
greater significance would be placed on the government’s charging decision and 
therefore shift increasingly more power to the prosecution.  An offender’s sentence 
would be greatly impacted by whether the government elected to charge a threshold 
controlled substance quantity in the indictment.  Thus, an offender may be strongly 
incentivized to plead guilty should the government be willing to reduce the charge to 
the distribution of an unspecified quantity of a controlled substance.   
  Another drawback is that those unfamiliar with the relevant statutory limits 
on sentencing may be misled by looking solely at the Chapter Two offense guidelines.  
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of drug quantity as the driving force behind offense level enhancements.  
Should the Commission determine, as it already has, that drug quantity is a 
poor proxy for the offender’s role in the offense,
140
 it should craft a drug dis-
tribution guideline that places less emphasis on drug quantity and more em-
phasis on whatever specific offense characteristics the Commission deems 
more relevant. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Sentencing Commission’s overriding goal should be to fashion 
Guidelines that achieve actual fairness for defendants.  Thus, the Commission 
should incorporate statutory limitations on sentences into the Guidelines only 
to the minimum extent necessary.  Because the Guidelines already account 
for applicable statutory minimum or maximum sentences through section 
5G1.1, the Commission need not skew its Chapter Two offense guidelines to 
incorporate mandatory minimums or statutory maximums.  Mandatory mini-
mums should never be extrapolated wholesale across an entire offense guide-
line, as the Commission has done with the drug distribution guideline, be-
cause the extrapolation does not reflect the Commission’s independent judg-
ment as to fair punishment.  Where no actual unfairness results because man-
datory minimums are applicable to every defendant, such minimums should 
be written into the offense guidelines as cliffs accompanied by trailing plat-
eaus.  The mandatory minimums applicable to drug distribution offenses 
should not be incorporated into the drug distribution guideline at all, howev-
er, because some defendants sentenced pursuant to the drug distribution 
guideline are not subject to any mandatory minimum.  Thus, the Commission 
should amend the drug distribution offense guideline to reflect its independ-
ent judgment regarding fair punishment.  Otherwise, mandatory minimum 
sentences will continue to be replicated in the Guidelines ranges of defend-
ants to whom no mandatory minimums apply.  Such unwarranted replication 
amounts to actual unfairness. 
  
  
A prospective offender could consult Chapter Two, calculate the applicable guide-
lines, and decide that the potential payoff from the offense is worth the risk of pun-
ishment at that level.  The would-be offender would not be notified in Chapter Two 
that the true punishment may be greatly affected by a five or ten year statutory mini-
mum.  Although transparency of the Guidelines is a concern, that goal need not be 
achieved solely in Chapter Two.  It is not unfair to put the burden on Guidelines users 
to consult the entire Manual and learn in Chapter Five that the guideline range is 
constrained by any applicable statutory limits on sentencing. 
 140. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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Table 1: Data underlying Figure 1, Betel Nut Offense Guideline, 
Pure Offense Guideline 
 
Quantity of nuts 
distributed 





sentence in months 
1 6 0-6 3 
250 8 0-6 3 
1000 10 6-12 9 
2500 12 10-16 13 
5000 14 15-21 18 
10,000 16 21-27 24 
20,000 18 27-33 30 
40,000 20 33-41 37 
60,000 22 41-51 46 
80,000 24 51-63 57 
100,000 26 63-78 70.5 
400,000 28 78-97 87.5 
700,000 30 97-121 109 
1,000,000 32 121-151 136 
3,000,000 34 151-188 169.5 
10,000,000 36 188-235 211.5 
30,000,000 38 235-293 264 
Table 2: Data underlying Figure 2, Betel Nut Offense Guideline, 
Wholesale Extrapolation Approach 
Quantity of nuts 
distributed 




Mean Guidelines  
sentence in months 
1 6 0-6 3 
100 8 0-6 3 
250 10 6-12 9 
500 12 10-16 13 
750 14 15-21 18 
1000 16 21-27 24 
2500 18 27-33 30 
4000 20 33-41 37 
6000 22 41-51 46 
8000 24 51-63 57 
10,000 26 63-78 70.5 
40,000 28 78-97 87.5 
80,000 30 97-121 109 
400,000 32 121-151 136 
700,000 34 151-188 169.5 
1,000,000 36 188-235 211.5 
3,000,000 38 235-293 264 
  
 141. Assumes Criminal History category I. 
 142. Assumes Criminal History category I. 
34
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss3/2
File: 6.Bennardo.F Created on: 2/17/2014 3:16:00 PM Last Printed: 2/17/2014 3:16:00 PM 
2013] DECOUPLING FEDERAL OFFENSE GUIDELINES 717 
Table 3: Data underlying Figure 3, Betel Nut Offense Guideline, 
Cliffs Approach 
Quantity of nuts 
distributed 





sentence in months 
1 6 0-6 3 
250 8 0-6 3 
1000 10 6-12 9 
2500 12 10-16 13 
5000 14 15-21 18 
10,000 24 60-63 61.5 
20,000 24 60-63 61.5 
40,000 24 60-63 61.5 
60,000 24 60-63 61.5 
80,000 24 60-63 61.5 
100,000 26 63-78 70.5 
400,000 30 120-121 120.5 
700,000 30 120-121 120.5 
1,000,000 32 121-151 136 
3,000,000 34 151-188 169.5 
10,000,000 36 188-235 211.5 




 143. Where applicable, the Guidelines range is constricted by the operation of 
section 5G1.1, which limits a defendant’s Guideline range to the permissible bounds 
of any applicable statutory minimum or maximum.  See U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1 (2013).  Guidelines range assumes criminal history 
category I. 
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